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1 
THE NEOLIBERAL TURN IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
Jason J. Czarnezki* and Katherine Fiedler** 
 
Abstract 
 
Regulation has taken a neoliberal turn, using market-based 
mechanisms to achieve social benefits, especially in the context of 
environmental protection, and promoting information dissemination, 
labeling, and advertising to influence consumer preferences. Although this 
turn to neoliberal environmental regulation is well under way, there have 
been few attempts to manage this new reality. Instead, most commentators 
simply applaud or criticize the turn. If relying on neoliberal environmental 
reform (i.e., facing this reality regardless of one’s view of this turn), 
regulation and checks on these reforms are required. This Article argues 
that in light of the shift from traditional to neoliberal “substantive” 
environmental regulation, “procedural” checks are required through 
regulation and legislation to improve the quality of the market-based and 
informational neoliberal approaches, including oversight via regulation 
that ensures accuracy in valuation of natural resources, increases and 
improves the quality of the information provided by consumers, and 
requires greater accountability and accuracy from institutions making 
green claims to consumers. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulation has taken a neoliberal turn. Neoliberalism denotes “forms of 
political-economic governance premised on the extension of market relationships.”1 
Neoliberal environmental regulation includes the use of market-based mechanisms 
to achieve environmental protection (often referred to as “free-market 
environmentalism”) and information dissemination and regulation (such as labeling 
and advertising) to influence consumer preferences. 2  This neoliberal turn in 
                                                     
* © 2016 Jason J. Czarnezki. A.B., J.D., University of Chicago; Gilbert and Sarah 
Kerlin Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law and Executive Director of 
Environmental Law Programs, Pace University School of Law. 
** © 2016 Katherine Fiedler. J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2017). 
We wish to thank Margot Pollans and sociologist Andrea Voyer for their valuable insights 
into this project, as well as Lucie Olejnikova for her valuable research assistance on this 
project. 
1 Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality, 63 STUD. POL. 
ECON., no. 3, 2000, at 5, 5. 
2  One might consider these tools as part of the same neoliberal category, as 
informational regulations can be considered market-based in that the ultimate catalyst of 
systemic change is producer response to potential reputational harm from revealed 
information or response to a shift in consumer preferences.  
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environmental regulation has received much criticism—that progressives have sold 
out to conservative free-market principles, and consumers are overwhelmed by the 
“green choices” provided by consumer brands. 3  The turn also has its share of 
supporters—arguing the approach creates incentives for technological innovation, 
improves efficiency, and lowers transaction costs by eschewing government 
mandates in favor of markets and replacing regulatory prohibitions with private 
property rights.4 
While this turn to neoliberal environmental regulation is a reality, there have 
been few attempts to manage it rather than simply applauding or criticizing the turn. 
As our reliance on neoliberal environmental reform continues (regardless of one’s 
view of this turn), regulation and checks on the neoliberal turn are required. This 
Article argues that in light of the shift from traditional “substantive” environmental 
regulation to neoliberal “substantive” environmental regulation, “procedural” 
checks are required through regulation and legislation to improve the quality of the 
market-based and informational neoliberal approaches. 
Part II of this Article defines neoliberal regulation and discusses the historical 
rise of neoliberal environmental regulation beginning with the Reagan and Clinton 
presidencies. Part III categorizes and discusses two key components of modern 
neoliberal environmental regulation: (1) market-based mechanisms; and (2) 
information labeling, considering examples at both the state and federal levels. The 
former seeks to avoid the problems and costs of traditional and centralized 
environmental law, and the latter seeks institutional isomorphism, pressuring 
consumers and institutions to conform to others in their preferences for 
environmentally friendly goods and sustainable business practices. In attempting to 
smooth the turn to neoliberal environmental regulation, Part IV argues that this 
regulatory shift needs “procedural” oversight via regulation that ensures accuracy in 
valuation of natural resources, increases and improves the quality of the information 
provided to consumers, and requires greater accountability and accuracy from 
institutions making green claims to consumers. 
 
II.  THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
Neoliberalism describes governance through a reliance on “market 
relationships.”5 “We now live in an era of ‘neoliberal governance’ in which political 
actors have abandoned the idea of central state decision making and instead rely on 
market processes, individual self-sufficiency and responsibility, devolution of 
decision making down to local scales, and the concomitant ‘hollowing out’ of the 
                                                     
3 See Jason J. Czarnezki, Andrew Homan & Meghan Jeans, Creating Order Amidst 
Food Eco-Label Chaos, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 281, 281–82 (2015) [hereinafter 
Czarnezki et al., Creating Order]. 
4  See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 21–25 (rev. ed. 2001) (explaining the difference between free market 
and political environmentalism). 
5 Larner, supra note 1, at 5. 
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nation-state.”6 The historical rise of neoliberal environmental regulation perhaps 
began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, but gained major traction during the 
Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton presidencies, both of which laid the foundation for 
the type of free-market and institutional isomorphic regulation seen today.7 This Part 
defines American neoliberal regulation and traces its rise, in the environmental 
context, since the 1980s following the end of the two decades wherein Congress 
passed numerous environmental statutes. 
 
A.  What Is Neoliberal Environmental Regulation? 
 
While neoliberalism may evade any one specific definition, it has been 
expressed over the last thirty years through various forms of local, national, and 
international experiments in laissez-faire political economy around the world, using 
regulations that aim to deploy markets as the solution to environmental problems.8 
As discussed below, there are multiple regulatory tools available for addressing 
environmental harms, or, for that matter, any resource or commodity. As seen in 
Table 1 below, these regulatory methods can be divided into the categories of 
traditional and neoliberal regulation.9  
  
                                                     
6  E. Melanie DuPuis & Brian J. Gareau, Neoliberal Knowledge: The Decline of 
Technocracy and the Weakening of the Montreal Protocol, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 1212, 1213 
(2008) (citations omitted). 
7 This is not to say that Congress did not employ market and informational approaches. 
See, e.g., the Environmental Impact Statement requirement in the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (establishing procedural requirements of 
information disclosure for federal projects that will significantly affect the environment).  
8 See Robert Plastow, Neoliberalism in Environmental Governance: A Paradoxical 
Double Movement?, ACADEMIA 1 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.academia.edu/2703516/Neoliberalism_in_environmental_governance_a_parad
oxical_double_movement [http://perma.cc/QT76-RLF2].  
9  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 123 (2006) (noting the regulatory 
constraints of the law, social norms, the market, and architecture); see generally Jay P. Kesan 
& Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 320 (2005) (recognizing that 
the law is not the “exclusive method of social regulation”); DAVID M. DRIESEN ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 2 (2d ed. 2011) 
(discussing “command-and-control regulation,” market-based alternatives, and information-
based approaches to environmental protection); JASON J. CARNEZKI, EVERYDAY 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2011) (including chapters discussing the “limitations and promise of 
law”).  
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Table 1: Traditional/Prescriptive Regulation versus Neoliberal 
Environmental Regulation  
Traditional/Prescriptive 
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
vs. 
Neoliberal Environmental 
Regulation 
Type Also Known As Type Also Known As 
Standard-
setting 
(including 
both 
performance 
standards and 
process 
standards) 
Technology-
based standards; 
health-effects 
standards 
Market-based Cost-benefit 
analysis, economic 
incentives; 
subsidies; taxes 
Bans Prohibitions Information Labeling; 
inventories; 
disclosures 
 
The traditional approach in environmental governance has been governmental 
regulation, commonly known as “command and control” regulation practices that 
rely on legally established limits enforced by the state.10 Professor James Salzman 
refers to these as “prescriptive” regulations, mandating “what parties can and cannot 
do—Thou Shalt or Thou Shalt Not.”11 “This is both the most direct and the most 
common form of environmental law.”12 Government regulations can set effects-
based or technology-based standards, demanding that harms do not surpass a 
specific threshold or requiring the use of certain technologies to reduce harm.13 
 
All environmental standards seek to reduce adverse effects in some 
way. Effects-based environmental standards, often referred to as “health-
based” or “environment-based” standards, do so by expressly determining 
the level of environmental quality deemed acceptable as a goal. . . . In 
establishing effects-based standards, we ask what level of environmental 
quality is adequate, or necessary, to protect health or environmental 
resources. The difficult part is deciding what is “adequate.”14  
 
For example, the Clean Air Act requires that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria air 
pollutants that “in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and 
                                                     
10 See Plastow, supra note 8, at 2. 
11 James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five 
P’s, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 364 (2013). 
12 Id. 
13 Jason J. Czarnezki, New York City Rules! Regulatory Models for Environmental and 
Public Health, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1626 (2015). 
14 DRIESEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 127. 
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allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”15 
Traditional environmental regulation can also require agencies to set standards and 
regulate entities to meet standards that available (or potentially available) 
technologies are capable of achieving. 16 For example, “[w]hen Congress passed the 
Clean Water Act, it changed the primary focus of federal law from the harm visited 
on the receiving water stream segments to end-of-pipe, technology-based permit 
limits.”17 
“There is considerable debate . . . over the efficiency of prescriptive 
regulations.”18 On the one hand, they may be “inefficient and unwieldy,” providing 
“little incentive for innovation because once the regulated party has satisfied the 
necessary requirement[s], the law creates no incentive to reduce harmful activities 
further.”19 On the other hand, traditional environmental regulation may encourage 
production-process and design innovations, through mandated reductions that can 
be accomplished only by such innovations, for example.20 
Whatever the perceived or real costs and benefits of traditional prescriptive 
environmental regulation, “many policies today contain elements of the neoliberal 
agenda and what has been called ‘freemarket [sic] environmentalism’ has 
proliferated in a dialogue between environmentalism and proponents of 
neoliberalism.”21 This dialogue continued with speed since the 1980s following the 
end of the track record of congressional passage of environmental statutes spanning 
two decades, resulting in the modern neoliberal environmental regulatory state.  
 
B.  The Rise of Neoliberal Environmental Regulation in American Politics 
 
Given the lack of environmental legislation passed at the national level in the 
U.S. since the 1980s,22 the types of inquiries and substantive boundaries of the field 
of environmental law have been traditionally defined by an influential group of 
federal environmental statutes, primarily passed by Congress in the 1960s through 
1980s and including the Clean Air Act,23 the Clean Water Act,24 and the National 
                                                     
15 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
16 DRIESEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 185. 
17 David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 267, 304 (2009). 
18 Salzman, supra note 11, at 365. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 365–66. 
21 See Plastow, supra note 8, at 2. 
22 For a list of federal environmental legislation since 1945, see Table 10.1 in Dennis 
L. Soden & Brent S. Steel, Evaluating the Environmental Presidency, in THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRESIDENCY 313, 315–17 (Dennis L. Soden ed., 1999); see also David 
Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional 
Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 51 (2014). 
23 Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012). 
24 Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012). 
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Environmental Policy Act.25 However, given the lack of new federal environmental 
legislation over the last two and a half decades (at least in the traditional sense), and 
with the support of think tanks and even environmental groups, there has been a rise 
in neoliberal and free market environmentalism beginning with the rise of Ronald 
Reagan’s free market economics and Clinton’s neoliberal “New Democratic” 
approach.26  
During the 1980s neoliberalism took hold under President Reagan (and under 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom), influenced by free-
market economists that sought deregulation and dismantlement of the regulatory and 
administrative state. 27  Reagan’s objective was “to decentralize government, 
overhaul regulations, and reestablish a laissez-faire economic system.”28 He also 
sought to move the environmental administrative agencies such as the EPA and 
Department of Interior (DOI) away from their traditional pursuits and toward a 
direction more friendly to business and less inclined to “command-and-control” 
regulation.29 
President Reagan’s Executive Order (EO) 1229130 put a regulatory moratorium 
on new rules and “put his imprint on the regulatory process by requiring the EPA 
and all administrative agencies to perform ‘regulatory impact analyses’ and submit 
the results, including cost-benefit analyses providing justification for regulatory 
activities, to the [Office of Management and Budget’s] Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)”.31 Reagan’s EO 12291, as well as EO 12498, which 
                                                     
25 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370 (2012). 
26 See Sharon Beder, Neoliberal Think Tanks and Free Market Environmentalism, 10 
ENVTL. POL. 128 (2001), http://www.uow.edu.au/~sharonb/thinktanks.html 
[http://perma.cc/22X5-C6R3]; see generally BYRON W. DAYNES & GLEN SUSSMAN, WHITE 
HOUSE POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT TO GEORGE W. BUSH 
(James P. Pfiffner et al. eds., 2010) (evaluating the environmental impacts and legacies of 
past presidents). 
27 See Plastow, supra note 8, at 1. 
28 Soden & Steel, supra note 22, at 334; see also DAYNES & SUSSMAN, supra note 26, 
at 186 (describing Reagan as “antiregulatory”). 
29 Jonathan P. West & Glen Sussman, Implementation of Environmental Policy: The 
Chief Executive, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRESIDENCY 77, 94 (Dennis L. Soden ed., 1999).  
30 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. (1982). 
31 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 87, 95–96. Exec. Order No. 12,291, Section 2 
states:  
 
In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and 
developing legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to the extent 
permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements: 
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning 
the need for and consequences of proposed government action; 
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society; 
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society; 
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created a regulatory planning process,32 “enabled OIRA to delay, scrutinize, and 
revise hundreds of environmental regulations, minimizing the burdens and 
compliance costs to industry.”33  
The election of George H.W. Bush following Reagan’s two-term presidency 
allowed for the continuation of Republican preferences for deregulation and a free 
market to achieve environmental goals. 34  For example, George H.W. Bush’s 
Council on Competitiveness (which was terminated by President Bill Clinton) was 
designed to consider the impact of proposed rules on the economy in general or 
specific economic sectors with a goal of minimizing regulatory burdens on the 
economy.35 
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments were passed and signed into law during 
the Bush Administration with overwhelming bipartisan support,36 employing free-
market principles. The Acid Rain Program (ARP)37 aimed to reduce sulfur dioxide 
through a cap and trade program, the first in the country, implemented in three 
phases, beginning in 1995, 2000, and 2010.38 The EPA set a cap of sulfur dioxide 
emissions and allocated allowances to the power sector.39 The ARP also regulated 
nitrogen oxide emissions, but under a traditional regulatory scheme, not a cap and 
trade program.40 For the sulfur dioxide cap and trade program, sources may sell or 
save any allowances they do not need due to reductions in their own emissions.41 
The goal of the program was to reduce annual sulfur dioxide emissions “by 10 
                                                     
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the 
alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and 
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the 
aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the 
particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national 
economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future. 
 
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (1981). 
32 See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. (1985) (stating it was created to “establish 
Administration regulatory priorities, increase the accountability of agency heads for the 
regulatory actions of their agencies, provide for Presidential oversight of the regulatory 
process, reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, minimize duplication and 
conflict of regulations, and enhance public and Congressional understanding of the 
Administration’s regulatory objectives”). 
33 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 87. 
34 See Soden & Steel, supra, note 22, at 336. 
35 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 97–98. 
36 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, H.R. Res. 3030, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/101-1990/h137 [http://perma.cc/4WK2-HZTX]. 
37 40 C.F.R. §§ 72–78 (2012).  
38 Acid Rain Program: SO2 Reductions, U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
programs/arp/index.html [http://perma.cc/B854-BE8Y] (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).  
39 Id. 
40 Acid Rain Program: NOx Reductions, U.S. E.P.A., http://www2.epa.gov/airmarkets 
/acid-rain-program [http://perma.cc/22U8-P5CC] (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
41 Acid Rain Program: SO2 Reductions, supra note 38. 
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million tons below 1980 levels.”42 The Acid Rain Program has been successful thus 
far, leading to dramatic reductions in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide.43 
The Reagan and Bush Presidencies from 1980 to 1992 sought less government, 
free markets, and deregulation. “The Clinton administration, and the two Republican 
administrations that preceded it, were willing to experiment with flexible approaches 
(including market incentives) as supplements, or in some cases, alternatives to 
command-and-control regulation.”44 The irony and difference of the presidency of 
Bill Clinton that followed was that there was a desire for more government and 
regulation, but that those government services and regulatory processes should be 
based on free market principles and reliance upon the market—principles of the 
“New Democratic” version of neoliberal regulation.  
The Clinton Presidency marked a dramatic shift in Congress’ view of the 
nation’s environmental laws as statutes, “once generally considered a positive force 
behind the improvement in the quality of our country’s air and water were [now] 
characterized by a new congressional majority as the tools of an overgrown and 
domineering federal bureaucracy which sought to regulate the specific details of 
individual property owners’ and businesses’ lives.”45 Newt Gingrich’s “Contract 
with America” insisted on the need for risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses for 
assessing the cost of all federal regulations on the private sector.46 
In light of the prevailing political climate, the Clinton Administration, which 
included the environmentally minded Al Gore as Vice President, sought to improve 
environmental regulation and all regulatory processes. These improvements would 
be accomplished by “reinventing” government with initiatives that sought to 
improve government performance, cutting red tape, streamlining government 
purchasing procedures, simplifying federal rules, and better coordinating federal 
management, as well as cutting layers of management jobs.47 For example, President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, which replaced the two Reagan cost-benefit 
orders, sought to create a more balanced approach, “reaffirming” regulatory 
decision-making processes in order to improve health and the environment through 
efficiency and cost-benefit analysis.48 EO 12866 states “agencies should assess all 
                                                     
42 Id. 
43 U.S. E.P.A., 2012 PROGRESS REPORT: SO2 AND NOX EMISSIONS, COMPLIANCE, AND 
MARKET ANALYSES 1 [hereinafter 2012 PROGRESS REPORT], http://www.epa.gov/air 
markets/documents/progressreports/ARPCAIR12_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/7RBS-EQ9V] 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
44 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 105. 
45 Andrew Mcfee Thompson, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: 
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1329 (1996). 
46 DAYNES & SUSSMAN, supra note 26, at 108. 
47 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 94, 96. 
48 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“The American 
people deserve a regulatory system that works for them, not against them: a regulatory 
system that protects and improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being and 
improves the performance of the economy without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable 
costs on society; regulatory policies that recognize that the private sector and private markets 
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costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of 
not regulating.” 49  The order indicates that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) should 
include both quantitative and qualitative measures and regulation should seek to 
“maximize net benefits . . . unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.”50 
“Clinton’s broader definition of CBA—which includes tangible and non-tangible 
considerations, encourages but does not require regulatory decisions based on CBA, 
and seeks to maximize ‘net benefits’ but does not require that they be monetized—
suggests the need to balance diverse values and goals when defending administrative 
regulations.”51  
Clinton’s specific initiatives included Project XL, which was “an effort to help 
business, state and local governments, and federal facilities work with EPA to 
develop and test innovative approaches to achieve better and more cost-effective 
environmental and public health protection,” operating from 1995 to 2002.52 Clinton 
said to companies: “If you can meet even higher environmental performance 
standards, we will provide flexibility and cut red tape so you can find the cheapest, 
most efficient ways to do it.”53 The Clinton Administration, with Al Gore at the 
helm, also created the National Performance Review, which sought to create a 
government that “works better and costs less.”54 
What is remarkable, and shows the powerful legacy of Reagan and Clinton, is 
the extent to which the Republican and Democratic presidencies that followed 
carried on the regulatory traditions of those administrations. For example, George 
W. Bush suspended all rulemaking via the Card Memo,55 and Barack Obama, while 
pro-regulation, continued to give enormous power to the Office of Management and 
                                                     
are the best engine for economic growth; regulatory approaches that respect the role of State, 
local, and tribal governments; and regulations that are effective, consistent, sensible, and 
understandable. We do not have such a regulatory system today. With this Executive order, 
the Federal Government begins a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory 
process. The objectives of this Executive order are to enhance planning and coordination 
with respect to both new and existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies 
in the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of 
regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process more accessible and open to the 
public.”). 
49 Id. at § 1. 
50 Id. 
51 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 87.  
52  Project XL, U.S. EPA., http://archive.epa.gov/projectxl/web/html/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/54M6-KV9D] (last updated Oct. 24, 2015). For project examples, see 
http://archive.epa.gov/projectxl/web/html/projects.html.  
53 West & Sussman, supra note 29, at 94. 
54 A Brief History of the National Performance Review, NAT’L PERFORMANCE REV., 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/brief.html [http://perma.cc/5RHB-
UH4B] (last updated Feb. 1997). 
55 Memorandum from Andrew Card, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 20, 2001), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79291 [http://perma.cc/8HV5-HBDE] (requesting 
that the heads and acting heads of Executive Departments and Agencies “send no proposed 
or final regulation to the Office of the Federal Register”). 
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Budget and promoted Clintonesque cost-benefit regulation through the selection of 
law professor Cass Sunstein to lead the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs.56  
The George W. Bush Administration used a number of free-market 
mechanisms in environmental regulation. For instance, utilizing existing authority 
under the Clean Water Act, the EPA implemented the Water Quality Trading Policy, 
which allows “one source to meet its regulatory obligations [TMDLs] by using 
pollutant reductions created by another source that has lower pollution control cost,” 
in the hopes of achieving water quality standards more efficiently.57 One report 
estimated that implementing these market-based approaches to water quality 
improvement could save $900 million per year, as compared with a strict command 
and control approach.58 The EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
provide grant funding in order to “encourage[] the implementation of water quality 
trading programs.” 59  These grant programs include EPA’s Targeted Watershed 
Grant, EPA’s Section 319 grants, and the USDA’s Conservation Innovation Grants 
Program, set forth in the 2002 Farm Bill.60 However, the success of the water quality 
trading program has been questionable: “[o]nly 100 facilities have participated in 
trading, and 80 percent of trades have occurred within a single trading 
program . . . .”61 
Similar to these executive efforts, Congress followed suit in implementing free-
market mechanisms. The 2002 Farm Bill also included market-based environmental 
mechanisms, including the Conservation Security Program, which set up payments 
for ecosystem services.62 Similarly, the 2008 Farm Bill sought “to facilitate the 
participation of farmers and landowners in environmental services markets,” as 
methods for farm conservation and land management.63 The USDA is directed to 
develop guidelines for measuring ecosystem services, such as carbon storage, water 
                                                     
56 See Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CAL. L. 
REV. 1457 (2014) (critiquing Sunstein’s cost-benefit analysis). 
57  U.S. E.P.A., WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (Jan. 13, 2003), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/upload/2008_09_12_watershed_trading_final
policy2003.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TAC-X53Y].  
58 Id. at 2. 
59 Mindy Selman et al., Water Quality Trading Programs: An International Overview, 
WRI ISSUE BRIEF 1, 3 (Mar. 2009), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/water_trading 
_quality_programs_international_overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/58U3-PSFR]. 
60 Id. 
61 U.S. E.P.A., EPA WATER QUALITY TRADING EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT ES-1 
(Oct. 2008), http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/upload/wqt.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
6S9A-RD98]. 
62 Alison G. Power, Ecosystem Services and Agriculture: Tradeoffs and Synergies, 365 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 2959, 2961 (2010).  
63 RENÉE JOHNSON, PROVISIONS SUPPORTING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES MARKETS IN U.S. 
FARM BILL LEGISLATION 1 (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.eoearth.org/files/182801_182900/ 
182890/rl34042.pdf [http://perma.cc/QK7R-2WMD] (noting “providers of environmental 
services can be compensated in private markets for the services they provide”). 
2016] NEOLIBERAL TURN IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 11 
 
filtration, and flood control.64 These market-based mechanisms, and the programs 
within which they have been implemented, continue to function, as seen by 
subsequent farm bills. 
The Clear Skies Initiative (CSI) was the first of a series of programs that 
complemented the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR, discussed below). The 
CSI, introduced in 2003, would set a cap on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions.65 If sources of these emissions are able to make reductions early in the 
program, they can earn allowances to be used later.66 However, this initiative was 
never enacted, as it did not get through the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works.67  
Also within the air context, the NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP), 
implemented between 2003 and 2008, “was a cap and trade program created to 
reduce the regional transport of NOx emissions from power plants and other large 
combustion sources in the eastern United States.”68 NBP was replaced by the Clean 
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).69 CAIR was promulgated in 2005 and implemented in 
two phases.70 In 2009, the NOx emissions program was initiated by setting a cap, 
followed by the implementation of the SO2 emissions program in 2010.71 In 2015, 
the Phase II caps will be set for each of the two programs.72 The goal of CAIR “is to 
address regional interstate transport of soot . . . and smog . . . , which are associated 
with thousands of premature deaths and illnesses each year.”73 The Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule was set to replace CAIR in 2012,74 however the D.C. Circuit stayed 
and vacated the rule.75 Therefore, CAIR remained in place for several more years.76 
In combination with ARP, by 2012, CAIR reduced annual SO2 emissions to 3.3 
million tons, or 68% below 2005 levels, and annual NOx emissions to 1.7 million 
tons, or 53% below 2005 levels.77 The Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) intended 
“to permanently cap and reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants for 
                                                     
64 JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 1, 5. 
65 Clear Skies: Basic Information, U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/ 
basic.html [https://perma.cc/VNK2-ZFZK] (last updated Oct. 10, 2015).  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 NOx Budget Trading Program, U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
programs/nox/index.html [http://perma.cc/EC5G-SP3B] (last updated Aug. 13, 2015). 
69 Id. 
70 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
programs/cair/index.html [https://perma.cc/5PBL-Q76G] (last updated Aug. 21, 2015). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 43, at 2. 
76 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), supra note 70; Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
(CSAPR), U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/crossstaterule/ [http://perma.cc/655T-4WVN] 
(last updated July 28, 2015). 
77 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. 
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the first time ever.”78 However, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule, and the Supreme 
Court later dismissed the EPA’s petition for certiorari to review this vacatur.79 
The Obama Administration has continued the trend of using free-market 
environmental regulation. CSAPR “requir[ed] 28 states in the eastern half of the 
U.S. to significantly improve air quality by reducing power plant emissions that 
cross state lines and contribute to ozone and fine particle pollution in other states,” 
again regulating nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide.80 The implementation of this 
program was delayed following the D.C. Circuit’s decision to vacate the rule.81 The 
D.C. Circuit on October 23, 2014, granted the EPA’s request to lift the stay on the 
rule and shift the deadlines by three years.82 The first phase of CSAPR will now be 
implemented in 2015, and the second phase in 2017.83 
Similarly, the Clean Power Plan, proposed on June 2, 2014, set forth the goal 
of “cut[ting] carbon emissions from the power sector by 30 percent nationwide 
below 2005 levels” by 2030.84 The rule allows states to develop their own plans to 
meet these goals, which can include market-based programs.85 
The 2014 Farm Bill included many programs that implement market-based 
mechanisms, using the valuation of ecosystem services and alternate land uses in 
order to incentivize conservation practices. The Conservation Stewardship Program 
(CSP) of the 2014 Farm Bill is a voluntary program that provides incentives to 
agricultural producers for “maintain[ing] and improv[ing] their existing 
conservation systems and adopt[ing] additional conservation activities.”86 The CSP 
provides payments to its participants annually for new conservation activities and 
for maintaining those already in place.87 Payments are also made for the adoption of 
conservation crop rotation practices: “[T]he higher the performance, the higher the 
                                                     
78 Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. E.P.A., http://archive.epa.gov/mercuryrule/web/html/ 
index.html [http://perma.cc/L7GC-XYF3] (last updated Aug. 29, 2015).  
79 Id; New Jersey v. United States Envt’l Prot. Agency, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(vacating the CAMR because it allowed the EPA to regulate mercury emissions under an 
improper section of the Clean Air Act).  
80 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 43, at 2. 
81 Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), supra note 76. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84  EPA Proposes First Guidelines to Cut Carbon Pollution from Existing Power 
Plants/Clean Power Plan Is Flexible Proposal to Ensure a Healthier Environment, Spur 
Innovation and Strengthen the Economy, Press Release, U.S. E.P.A. (June 2, 2014), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/5bb6d206
68b9a18485257ceb00490c98!OpenDocument [http://perma.cc/F5AW-SJ7B]. 
85  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,838, 34,847 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  
86  U.S.D.A., 2014 Farm Bill: Conservation Stewardship Program, NAT. RES. 
CONSERVATION SERV. [hereinafter 2014 Farm Bill], http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/ 
nrcs/detail/national/programs/farmbill/?cid=stelprdb1242683 [http://perma.cc/WX7P-
X2CX] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
87 Id. 
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payment.” 88  The Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP) also 
provides funding for the purchasing of wetland reserve easements.89 Similarly, the 
Healthy Forests Reserve Program (HFRP) provides funding for restoration projects 
or easements of forest resources.90 
Given the continued trend at the national level toward incorporating economic 
principles into environmental regulation, it is not surprising to see policies based on 
market mechanisms at all levels of government and which, due to the political 
constraints of traditional environmental law and regulation, provide consumers with 
information about the nature of the goods being purchased. In addition, coupled with 
the need and desire for environmental improvement, we have seen industry 
voluntarily implement private environmental governance91 and, like some federal 
programs, offer consumers information and labels about the environmental 
conditions in the making of goods. This is the turn toward neoliberal environmental 
regulation—an attempt to avoid the problems and costs of traditional and centralized 
environmental law through cost-benefit balancing, and to seek institutional 
isomorphism, pressuring consumers and institutions to conform to others in their 
preferences for environmentally friendly goods and sustainable business practices. 
 
III.  NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
Part III categorizes and describes modern neoliberal environmental regulation 
into (1) market-based mechanisms, and (2) information labeling, considering 
examples at both the state and federal level as illustrated in Table 2 below. The 
former seeks to avoid the problems and costs of traditional and centralized 
environmental law, and the latter seeks institutional isomorphism, pressuring 
consumers and institutions to conform to others in their preferences for 
environmentally friendly goods and sustainable business practices. 
  
                                                     
88 Id. 
89 U.S.D.A., Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION 
SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/acep/ 
[http://perma.cc/PQX5-346M] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
90  U.S.D.A., Healthy Forests Reserve Program, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/forests/ 
[http://perma.cc/M4D4-W3XJ] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
91 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 129, 133 (2013). 
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Table 2: Types and Examples of Neoliberal Environmental Regulation 
Type Examples 
Market-based Cap-and-trade greenhouse gas programs; 
valuation of ecosystem services; conservation 
subsidies 
Information Toxic Release Inventory; organic labeling; 
Vermont GMO labeling bill 
 
Products of this proliferation, which we have also seen outside the 
environmental context (e.g., school choice, urban renewal), include tradable 
emission permits, eco-taxes, transferable fishing quotas, use of the valuation of 
ecosystem services, user fees for public goods and the privatization of public space,92 
as well as consumer labeling. Recently, due to the failure to regulate the 
environmental costs of our food choices directly, the new national dietary guidelines 
sought to incorporate environmental standards, until Congress objected.93  
Society can pursue market-based regulations that take into consideration cost-
benefit analyses, economic incentives (e.g., subsidies) or disincentives (e.g., taxes), 
and the valuation of ecosystem services. “[M]arket-based approaches, such as 
pollution charges and trading of pollution permits/credits, attempt to harness market 
                                                     
92 This could include privately owned public spaces in New York City, and the rise of 
land conservation easements rather than traditional conservation of public lands through 
national or local parks. See Jessica Owley, Neo-Liberal Land Conservation and Social 
Justice, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION NAT. ACAD. ENVTL. L. E-J. 7–8 (Apr. 16, 2012) 
(“Conservation easements are part of a trend of compensating landowners for environmental 
services and amenities. They are part of a soft environmental policy that reinforces the 
neoliberalization of conservation. Soft policies involve instruments that are flexible, subject 
to negotiation, and consistent with market approaches. In these approaches, market forces 
are harnessed in an effort to improve ecosystem management and enhance human well-being. 
In this respect, neoliberalism restructures conservation mechanisms to facilitate the spread 
of market-based mechanisms. One of neoliberalism’s chief techniques for achieving that goal 
is reregulating nature through forms of commodification. Commodification is a process 
whereby states transform previously untradeable things into tradable commodities. By 
recognizing the right to develop land as a property right that can be broken off the property-
rights bundle, conservation easements do just that. The win-win aspect of conservation 
easements wherein landowners receive compensation, developers receive permits, and the 
public receives increased environmental protection appears to fit into the neoliberal ‘promise 
of a world where one can eat one’s conservation cake and have development dessert too.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
93 Dan Charles, Congress to Nutritionists: Don’t Talk About the Environment, NPR 
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/12/15/370427441/congress-to-
nutritionists-dont-talk-about-the-environment [http://perma.cc/E2NW-HLKZ]. The idea of 
including environmental considerations in dietary guidelines also gained traction in Sweden, 
until the idea was abandoned for political reasons. Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food 
Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 24 (2011). 
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forces to achieve equal or greater amounts of pollution control [than prescriptive 
regulation] in a more cost-efficient manner.”94  
“Proponents of free market environmentalism advocate utilizing market forces 
to allocate and enforce environmental rights, while challenging the ability of more 
centralized political controls to adequately and efficiently protect the 
environment.” 95  Market-based approaches, while currently popular, may prove 
challenging to implement. To the extent privatization is required, environmental 
resources are not easily amenable to commodification, and there are normative 
concerns that rub against privatization of environmental amenities in the public 
domain.96 Financial penalties (e.g., charges, taxes), however, increase the cost of 
polluting activities, discouraging pollution and waste and forcing the polluter to bear 
the costs of her activities.97 The challenge to any such financial penalty is getting the 
price right and alleviating political concerns as taxes seem never to be popular.98 
Rather than a stick, the financial payment can also be a carrot in the form of payment 
or subsidy. Thus, one solution to the palatability problem for behavior-modifying 
regulation (discussed below) is to choose carrots versus sticks based on the level of 
public palatability of the regulation. This section will discuss valuation 
methodologies for resources and services, especially those that do not hold a direct 
market value. This section will then describe examples of how market-based 
mechanisms have been employed, including their early use, ecosystem services, cap 
and trade programs, and the incorporation of market-based mechanisms into existing 
regimes.  
 
A.  Valuation Methods 
 
Market-based mechanisms, as opposed to command-and-control regulations, 
may have the potential to “provide a more cost-effective way of achieving a given 
level of environmental quality.”99 Market-based mechanisms require the valuation 
of natural resources in order to incorporate environmental regulations into the 
market forces. Methods used for the valuation of natural resources vary according 
to the type of resource and whether direct markets for the resource exist. When direct 
markets exist, methods include the market price approach, the appraisal method, and 
                                                     
94 Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion 
of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 565, 565 (1992). 
95 See Thompson, supra note 45, at 1330. 
96 Salzman, supra note 11, at 368. 
97 Id. at 370. 
98 Id. at 371. 
99  ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT N. STAVINS, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: INTEGRATING THEORY AND PRACTICE ¶ 2.3 (Ctr. For Sci. & 
Int’l Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 91-15, 1991), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files 
/disc_paper_91_15.pdf [http://perma.cc/KHJ4-K9MP].  
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the replacement cost method, among others.100 Even where no markets exist, the 
valuation of natural resources can still be accomplished through methods such as the 
contingent valuation method, hedonic price method, and travel cost method, among 
others.101 These valuation methods can estimate use and nonuse values. Use values 
describe the actual use and enjoyment of the environment or of natural resources, 
whether it be direct (e.g., hunting, hiking, resource extraction) or indirect (e.g., 
nature television shows or ecosystem services).102 Option values, another form of 
use values, describe the value of maintaining the option to use a natural resource in 
the future.103 Nonuse values include bequest values, or the value of ensuring that 
future generations will be able to use a natural resource, and existence values, or the 
value that one places upon “simply knowing that something exists, even if they will 
never see it or use it.”104 
The market price approach simply considers the market valuation of a natural 
resource. 105  The appraisal method compares the fair market value of natural 
resources that have been damaged with comparable ones that remain undamaged.106 
As seen in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), natural 
resources can also be valued according to their restoration and replacement cost, or 
“the cost to restore, rehabilitate, or replace the resource or resource services without 
injury to the level of the resource stock or service flow.” 107  The valuation of 
ecosystem services is an effort to break down the value of ecosystems into 
marketable resources in order to estimate the value of an ecosystem that, as a whole, 
has no direct market.  
Contingent valuation allows natural resources to be valued when there is no 
direct market by surveying individuals as to how much they would be willing to pay 
to protect or maintain certain natural resources, thus estimating both use and nonuse 
values.108 The hedonic pricing method compares sites containing different natural 
resources, such as one near a forest or one with a view. 109  By comparing the 
difference in the two property values, assuming all else, but the natural resources 
considered, is equal, the price of the natural resource with no direct market value 
                                                     
100 C.A. ULIBARRI & K.F. WELLMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE VALUATION: A PRIMER ON 
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 5 (1997), http://www.environmentalmanager.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/04/valuation_primer_from_doe.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PWZ-JBT9]. 
101 Id.  
102 Valuation of Ecosystem Services, ECOSYSTEM VALUATION, http://www.ecosystem 
valuation.org/1-02.htm [http://perma.cc/7QFL-FWPX] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 ULIBARRI & WELLMAN, supra note 100, at 7. 
106 Id. at 11. 
107 Id. at 13. 
108 Socioeconomic Assessment: Natural Resource Value, NAT’L ESTUARINE RESEARCH 
RESERVE SYS., http://nerrs.noaa.gov/doc/siteprofile/acebasin/html/socioecn/ 
rvnatres.htm [http://perma.cc/6H37-FUCS] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
109 Id. 
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can be inferred.110 The travel cost method considers the time and travel expenses 
required to use a natural resource, for example, those costs required to visit a state 
park.111 By multiplying these costs by the number of users of the resource, the use 
value of a resource can be estimated.112  
 
B.  Examples 
 
Market-based mechanisms can be found in federal environmental legislation as 
far back as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902, in which projects were to be assessed 
by considering both the costs and benefits.113 Again, the Flood Control Act of 1936 
required the consideration of both the costs and benefits of flood control projects.114 
But the early legislation of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which defined the traditional field of environmental law, including the Clean Air 
Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972, largely ignored the use of market-
based mechanisms, focusing instead on technology or environmental standards.115 It 
is only recently that we have embraced the use of market-based approaches, such as 
incentives, disincentives, and environmental valuation, and expanded its 
implementation, as a part of the neoliberal environmental turn (see Part II above). 
 
1.  Early Use of Market-Based Mechanisms 
 
Triggering the expansion of the use of market-based mechanisms were the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, requiring the use of cost-benefit 
analyses in environmental impact statements, Executive Order 12291 in 1981, 
requiring cost-benefit analyses to justify major rules, and, especially, the passage of 
both CERCLA in 1980 and OPA in 1990.116 Both CERCLA and OPA use market-
based mechanisms and environmental valuation, for the assessment of natural 
resource damages. 117  For example, CERCLA’s damage assessment process 
“explicitly calls for the estimate of interim lost values of injured natural resources 
                                                     
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 JONATHAN ARMAH ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING FEDERAL 
WATER PROJECTS: U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS PLANNING AND THE USE OF BENEFIT 
COST ANALYSIS 11 (Aug. 2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/evans. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/KHG6-ZB5E]; see also DOUGLAS W. LIPTON ET AL., ECONOMIC 
VALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: A HANDBOOK FOR COASTAL RESOURCE 
POLICYMAKERS 4 (June 1995), http://www.mdsg.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/Economic 
%20Valuation%20of%20Natural%20Resources.pdf [http://perma.cc/7X5Q-EMNF]. 
114 LIPTON ET AL., supra note 113, at 4.  
115 Id. at 5. 
116  Id.; Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility 
Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 
482 (2000) (discussing the passage of OPA being prompted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
as well as several other oil spills in 1989 and early 1990).  
117 LIPTON ET AL., supra note 113, at 5.  
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and resource services.”118 In both statutes, natural resource damages include “the 
cost of restoring injured natural resources to their baseline condition, compensation 
for the interim loss of injured resources pending recovery, and the reasonable costs 
of a damage assessment.” 119  These calculations are made using market and 
nonmarket methods, as discussed above, including considerations of interim lost 
use, contingent valuation, and use and nonuse values.120 OPA’s natural resource 
damages assessment procedures were finalized in 1996.121 Unlike previous rules, 
this final rule stated that the purpose of OPA’s natural resource damage assessments 
was to “make the environment and the public whole.”122 OPA and CERCLA are 
“compensatory in nature and . . . in theory . . . have been located roughly within the 
domain of corrective justice.”123 However, as retroactive market mechanisms, these 
statutes highlight some of the limitations of market-based environmental policies, in 
that valuation is often more easily conducted after damage has been done.  
 
2.  Valuation of Ecosystem Services 
 
The valuation of ecosystem services has allowed for market-based mechanisms 
to become more holistic in scope and to expand to natural resources beyond those 
directly exchanged in the market. Ecosystem services have increasingly been 
considered in environmental decision-making, and land use decision-making in 
particular. Ecosystem services describe the “benefits humans obtain from 
ecosystems,” and can be categorized as supporting, regulating, provisioning, or 
cultural services.124 Examples of these services include food and water provisions, 
                                                     
118 Id. 
119  Natural Resource Damages: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. E.P.A., 
http://www2.epa.gov/superfund/natural-resource-damages-frequently-asked-questions#2 
[http://perma.cc/9JQR-6G65] (last visited October 24, 2015); see Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 107(a)(4)(C), (f)(1), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1) (2012); Oil Pollution Act §§ 1001(5), 1002(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2701(5), 2702(b)(2) (2012); see also Patrick E. Tolan, Natural Resource Damages Under 
CERCLA: Failures, Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409, 417 (2008) 
(discussing the use of baseline conditions, compensation, and interim loss for damage 
restoration). 
120 Natural Resource Damages: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 119. See also 
Jason J. Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Nonuse Values in Natural Resource 
Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 520 (2005) (arguing that nonuse 
values should be used more frequently in natural resource damage assessments). 
121 James S. Seevers, Jr., Note, NOAA’s New Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
Scheme: It’s Not About Collecting Money, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1513, 1514; see 15 
C.F.R. § 990 (2014).  
122 Seevers, supra note 121, at 1538. 
123  Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market 
Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REV. 365, 374 (1995).  
124 Brendan Fisher et al., Valuing Ecosystem Services: Benefits, Values, Space and Time 
4 (United Nations Env’t Programme, Div. of Envtl. Policy Implementation, Working Paper 
No. 3, 2011), http://www.bioecon-network.org/pages/UNEP_publications/03%20Valuing 
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air quality and climate regulation, gene pool protection, and recreation, among 
others.125 The value of the erosion prevention provided by coral reefs, for example, 
has been estimated to equal $153,214 per hectare per year on average.126 The value 
of these services is enormous: “for the entire biosphere, the value [of just seventeen 
ecosystem services] (most of which is outside the market) is estimated to be in the 
range of US $16-54 trillion per year . . . . [b]ecause of the nature of the uncertainties, 
this must be considered a minimum estimate.”127 Valuation of ecosystem services 
“help[s] to make decisions about allocating resources between competing uses 
whereby it should be realized that monetary values that are based on market prices 
only, usually neglect the rights (values) of future generations.”128 Thus, the valuation 
of ecosystem services provides a more complete understanding of the value of 
natural resources, beyond the more obvious direct market prices.129  
Valuation of ecosystem services is used in land-use decision-making to allow 
for more “holistic decision processes that integrate and balance conservation with 
land use goals.”130 For example, China’s Natural Forest Conservation Program and 
Grain to Green Program both acknowledge the enormous value of ecosystem 
services and provide payments for logging forbearance, forest reseeding, and crop 
conversion. 131  These programs exemplify a determination that the value of 
conservation of these natural resources exceed the continuation of logging or 
intensive crop production.132  
Meanwhile, the United States Office of Environmental Markets was developed 
in response to the Farm Bill of 2008 to “support[] the Secretary [of Agriculture] in 
the development of emerging markets for . . . ecosystem services.”133 In Eugene, 
Oregon, the Eugene Water and Electric Board (EWEB) transitioned from a “stifled 
regulation-based approach” to an incentive-based approach premised on the value 
                                                     
%20Ecosystem%20Services.pdf [http://perma.cc/WT96-MFCC]. 
125 Rudolf de Groot et al., Global Estimates of the Value of Ecosystems and Their 
Services in Monetary Units, 1 ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 50, 53 (2012), http://www.science 
direct.com/science/article/pii/S2212041612000101 [http://perma.cc/YT76-XD4D]. 
126 Id. at 55 (summarizing the monetary value of twenty-two ecosystem services per 
biome).  
127 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 16 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).  
128 De Groot et al., supra note 125, at 51 (citation omitted).  
129 Id. 
130 Joshua Kahan, A Framework for Ecosystem Services Conservation Zoning: An 
Integration into Land Use Planning 1 (May 1, 2007) (unpublished Masters of Environmental 
Studies Capstone Project, University of Pennsylvania), http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1014&context=mes_capstones [http://perma.cc/DHU4-M7B7]. 
131 Jianguo Liu et al., Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects of China’s Policies for 
Ecosystem Services, 105 PNAS 9477, 9477–79 (2008), http://chans-net.org/sites/chans-
net.org/files/JLiu_2008_PNAS.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y85Z-XV8K].  
132 Id. at 9477. 
133 Office of Environmental Markets, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/oce/ 
environmental_markets/ [http://perma.cc/WLM3-FCD2] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
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of the ecosystem services provided by riparian areas. 134  Rather than require 
landowners to maintain a 200-foot riparian buffer zone, landowners can now receive 
compensation for voluntarily maintaining or improving riparian areas on their 
land. 135  In Hawaii, studies have been conducted to determine the land-use 
development plan for the largest private landowner that will best “balance[] multiple 
private and public values,” factoring in ecosystem services such as climate 
regulation, food, and energy security.136 
 
3.  Cap and Trade Programs 
 
Cap and trade programs are examples of market-based mechanisms, which rely 
on the valuation of air or water quality, as “policymakers establish a socially 
desirable level of aggregate emissions for a given pollutant.”137 From this level, 
emissions are then allocated among producers who receive permits to continue to 
emit that pollutant.138 For example, the California carbon cap and trade program 
includes 85% of greenhouse gas sources within the state and sets its limits according 
to the mandated greenhouse gas emissions levels set forth in the Global Warming 
Solutions Act.139  
Under the EPA’s Acid Rain Program, the Agency allocates allowances for 
sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions, which can then be bought and sold, or 
banked.140 As the EPA explains, “[t]he Acid Rain Program represents a dramatic 
departure from traditional command and control regulatory methods that establish 
specific, inflexible emissions limitations with which all affected sources must 
comply. Instead, [it] introduces an allowance trading system that harnesses the 
incentives of the free market to reduce pollution.”141 
  
                                                     
134  VIP Treatment: Rewarding Landowners for Riparian Stewardship, OR. EXPL., 
http://oe.oregonexplorer.info/ExternalContent/VIPRiparianStewardship/index.html#page1.
html [http://perma.cc/32FJ-LPTL] (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).  
135 Id.  
136 Joshua H. Goldstein et al., Integrating Ecosystem-Service Tradeoffs into Land-Use 
Decisions, 109 PNAS 7565, 7565 (2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/19/7565.full. 
pdf+html [http://perma.cc/7F2T-E3DA].  
137 James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 617 (2000).  
138 Id.  
139 Dallas Burtraw & Sarah Jo Szambelan, A Primer on the Use of Allowance Value 
Created Under California’s CO2 Cap-and-Trade Program, NEXT 10, May 11, 2012, at 2–3, 
http://next10.org/sites/next10.org/files/20120504_Primer_Revised_V5.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/KP3N-QVKQ].  
140 Acid Rain Program: SO2 Reductions, supra note 38. 
141 Id.  
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4.  Incorporating Market Mechanisms into Existing Regimes 
 
Traditional environmental regulatory regimes are also integrating 
environmental valuation, much like CERCLA and OPA integrate market valuation, 
within traditional command-and-control policies. This integration and consideration 
of environmental valuation has surrounded climate change mitigation and adaptation 
decision-making: “economic science has developed models that attempt to quantify 
the difference between the cost of mitigation actions (and their benefits in terms of 
avoided negative impacts) and the costs of inaction, aiming to calculate the optimal 
mitigation strategy from an economic perspective.”142 The EPA has considered and 
continues to consider market-based approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
as a part of their overall climate policy.143 The “EPA and other federal agencies use 
the social cost of carbon [SCC] to estimate the climate benefits of rulemakings.”144 
The SCC includes “(but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, 
human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of 
ecosystem services.”145 
 
C.  Informational Labeling 
 
Modern neoliberal environmental regulation in the form of information 
disclosure seeks institutional isomorphism—pressuring consumers and institutions 
to conform to others (both institutions and consumers) in their preferences for 
environmentally friendly goods and sustainable business practices.146 This can be 
                                                     
142 Jorge Hargrave et al., Cost-Benefit Analyses of Climate Change, 164 INT’L POL’Y 
CTR. FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH 1, 1 (2012), http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager164. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/CU8D-VRMK]. See also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT § 5.7 (2007) (estimating the effect 
climate change will have on world GDP).  
143  Evaluating Climate Policy Options, Costs and Benefits, U.S. E.P.A., 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics.html [http://perma.cc/64KW-
F3NU] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
144 The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA 
activities/economics/scc.html [http://perma.cc/G5RB-YCNX] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
145  INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 1, 1 (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf [http://perma.cc/WP3U-
9V6K].  
146 Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 
147–50 (1983), https://www.ics.uci.edu/~corps/phaseii/DiMaggioPowell-IronCageRevisit 
ed-ASR.pdf [https://perma.cc/K67X-88BJ]. The organizational structure, which used to arise 
from the rules of efficiency in the marketplace, now arises from the institutional constraints 
imposed by the state and the professions. Id. at 147. “[The] efforts to [achieve] rationality 
with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, 
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accomplished through legal requirements and private corporate practices. Thus, 
corporate entities pursue environmental initiatives (e.g., corporate sustainability and 
big organics), and consumers exert preferences, via their purchasing power, for 
environmentally friendly goods through government mandated and economically 
driven voluntary labeling. In this manner, consumer preferences dictate 
environmental change through purchases of goods that created less harm in their 
creation, rather than environmental change through direct substantive regulation of 
those harms. 
The government may regulate through mandatory information generation and 
labeling. Such information-based approaches can inform society about 
environmental and public health harms. Generation of information about the 
environmental consequences of actions can provide a means of encouraging better 
environmental performance for government institutions, private entities, and 
individuals.147 The theory behind informational approaches “is that the government 
can change people’s behavior by forcing them to think about the harm they are 
causing and by publicizing that harm.” 148  Information can direct government 
decision-making about how and whether to protect the environment, and can 
motivate private cleanup and avoidance of environmental problems.149 Examples of 
informational regulation include the Energy Star energy efficiency labeling 
program, the Toxic Release Inventory, the USDA Organic food labeling program, 
and the menu-labeling requirements found in the federal 2010 Affordable Care Act, 
requiring calorie information to be displayed on both vending machines and menus 
of restaurants with more than twenty locations nationwide. Professor Michael 
Vandenbergh, the leading scholar on private environmental governance, has even 
advocated for the creation of an Individual Carbon-Release Inventory,150 and has 
advocated for a global carbon labeling scheme.151 
Informational regulation can be useful when political will does not permit direct 
regulation, and studies indicate that information can trigger environmental norms. 
For example, increased awareness of consequences of individual transportation 
                                                     
[institutional isomorphism].” Id. “As an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond 
which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves performance.” Id. at 148. 
“[I]somorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.” Id. at 149. “[T]here are two 
types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional.” Id. “Organizations compete not just 
for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social 
as well as economic fitness.” Id. at 150.  
147 DRIESEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 329.  
148 Salzman, supra note 11, at 373. 
149 DRIESEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 329–31.  
150 Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1729–31 (2007). 
151 See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Time to Try Carbon Labelling, 1 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 4 (2011). 
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behavior has a positive effect on willingness to reduce personal car use.152 However, 
it can be costly to produce accurate and verifiable information, and informational 
regulation does not require changes in consumer or corporate behavior. 
This subpart focuses on two types of labeling: (1) that required by federal and 
state public law and; (2) that induced by private business—to illustrate the turn 
toward neoliberal environmental regulation. Food and durable good production and 
processing could be regulated directly by statute, but instead consumers are being 
asked to facilitate environmental change through purchasing power to encourage 
companies to respond to those preferences. Of course, the challenge, or perhaps 
problem, with this type of neoliberal regulation is that informational distribution 
does not necessarily change actual practices and consumers’ preferences may be 
poorly linked to actual environmental progress.  
 
1.  Government Labels and Third-Party Certification 
 
The past two decades have seen increased interest and prominence in labeling 
for environmental and energy concerns. In 1992, the EPA introduced its Energy Star 
program as a “voluntary labeling program designed to identify and promote energy-
efficient products” in order to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”153 Under the 
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) and the National Organic Program 
(NOP), the U.S. government creates production, handling, and labeling standards 
for organic agricultural products. In the United States and abroad, environmental 
labeling for food is gaining wide interest, as exemplified by the passage of 
Vermont’s GMO labeling legislation.154 The challenge with this trend is that labels 
can create consumer confusion, they may be at best proxies for the environmental 
information that is actually desire by consumers, and high-quality information may 
be challenging to gather. 
 
(a)  Energy Star155 
 
Begun as a voluntary product-labeling program, the Energy Star program is 
now a joint effort of the EPA and the U.S. Department of Energy to promote the 
consumer purchase of energy-efficient products for the home. The program helps 
consumers by allowing the Energy Star label to be placed on energy-efficient 
products ranging from computer printers to dehumidifiers and by providing tools for 
assessing the energy efficiency of existing homes and new home designs. The 
                                                     
152 Annika M. Nordlund & Jörgen Garvill, Effects of Values, Problem Awareness, and 
Personal Norm on Willingness to Reduce Personal Car Use, 23 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 339, 
345 (2003). 
153  History, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/about/history 
[http://perma.cc/H9ZK-7TCG] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
154 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043 (2014).  
155  This section relies on Chapter 3 of JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 42–43 (2011); see also ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/6S6L-UA4G] (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
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program claims to have prevented 40 million metric tons of greenhouse gases and 
saved more than $16 billion in utility bills in 2007 alone,156 with much of this 
reduction and savings coming from the labeling of consumer products.157 While the 
Energy Star program could do a better job of overseeing the label’s integrity,158 by 
focusing consumer buying power, these labels can increase the market for certain 
products and product characteristics. Governmental procurement has the same 
power, with the added ability to influence individual buying behavior through direct 
mandate or indirectly through increasing market availability. However, the Energy 
Star program is designed to cover more than consumer products like appliances and 
computers. In fact, entire newly built single-family homes and multi-family units 
can become Energy Star qualified.159  
Information about home energy usage in existing homes can be delivered at 
multiple points. Existing homes need energy audits to recommend energy saving 
changes. Energy Star recommends contractors to do audits through its Home Per-
formance program, though many nonaffiliated contractors can do energy audits in 
most local areas. Buyers also can gain information about home energy use upon 
purchase.160 Ideally, existing and prospective homeowners would know the potential 
upgrades needed to help efficiency, as well as fully appreciate their initial costs and 
their long-term economic and environmental payback. Ironically, as early as 1977, 
through President Carter’s Residential Conservation Service, utility companies and 
fuel companies were tasked with providing customers highly discounted home 
energy audits to increase energy conservation.161 However, just five years later, 
during the Reagan Administration, the program lapsed due to lack of funding. 
  
                                                     
156  ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR OVERVIEW OF 2007 ACHIEVEMENTS (2008), 
http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2007%20CPPD%204pg.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EX6C-GMEU]. 
157 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 9, at 371 (citing CLIMATE PROTECTION DIVISION, 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE POWER TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE: ENERGY STAR AND 
OTHER PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 11 (2000)) (“Moreover, the entire Energy Star program for 
labeling consumer products has prevented emissions of 5.7 million metric tons of carbon 
equivalent and saved over two billion dollars on energy bills in 1999 alone”). 
158  See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENERGY STAR 
PROGRAM CAN STRENGTHEN CONTROLS PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LABEL (2007), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090512005850/http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007 
/20070801-2007-P-00028.pdf [https://perma.cc/634B-Z88V]. 
159  See New Guidelines for Energy Star Certified New Homes, ENERGY STAR, 
https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=bldrs_lenders_raters.nh_2011_comments 
[https://perma.cc/VZN6-YNAH] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
160 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1228 (2013). 
161 See generally James A. Walker et al., A Review of the Residential Conservation 
Service Program, 10 ANN. REV. ENERGY 285 (1985) (reviewing the program, its history, its 
results, and the relevant statistics). 
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(b)  Organic Foods Production Act162 
 
The organic food market is flourishing. People want chemical-free foods for 
personal health and environmental reasons. In light of the economic benefits of 
organic production—organic products sell for much more than conventional ones—
the modern organic production and distribution system is now dominated by large-
scale “industrial organic” or “big organic” producers.” With large-scale production, 
even if organic, comes increased greenhouse gas emissions and questionable 
agricultural methods. Yet organic production also yields food produced and 
processed in a chemical-free environment, which is in demand. Organic food has 
almost quadrupled its market share in the last decade, and sales of organic food sales 
have grown from $3.6 billion in 1997 to over $39 billion in 2014.163 But all of this 
may not have happened without a regulatory model creating a value-added food 
label like “organic.” 
Under the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) and the National Organic 
Program (NOP), the U.S. government creates production, handling, and labeling 
standards for organic agricultural products.164 Individuals buy organic products to 
keep their bodies free of synthetics and pesticides, as well as promote sustainable 
and chemical-free agriculture.165 Organic farming emphasizes the use of renewable 
sources, land management that maintains natural soil fertility, water conservation, 
rich biodiversity, and long-term sustainability.166 
OFPA establishes a national organic certification program where agricultural 
products may be labeled as organic if produced and handled without the use of 
synthetic substances. The program prohibits using synthetic fertilizers, growth 
hormones and antibiotics in livestock,167 and adding synthetic ingredients during 
processing.168 However, exceptions exist, and some nonagricultural products and 
                                                     
162  This section on OFPA and the following section on COOL rely on Jason J. 
Czarnezki & Elena M. Mihaly, The Food Statutes, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 223 (2013); Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 
6501–6523 (2012). 
163 ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY, https://www.ota.com/sites/ 
default/files/indexed_files/StateOfOrganicIndustry.pdf [https://perma.cc/67T6-LCTZ] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
164 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2012). 
165  See Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for 
Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 649–52 (2010). 
166 Anne Plotto & Jan A. Narciso, Guidelines and Acceptable Postharvest Practices for 
Organically Grown Produce, 41 HORT. SCI. 287 (2006) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2014)). 
167 National Organic Program; Access to Pasture (Livestock), 75 Fed. Reg. 7154, 7162 
(Feb. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).  
168 7 U.S.C. §§ 6508(b)(1), 6509(c)(3), 6510 (2012). See also Plotto & Narcisco, supra 
note 166, at 287 (“Food must be produced without synthetic chemicals, except for those 
specifically allowed by regulations, and without substances (nonsynthetic and 
nonagricultural) prohibited by regulations, including no sewage sludge, ionizing radiation or 
bioengineering (7 CFR 205.105).”).  
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synthetics can be used on organic produce if they are on the National List.169 Such 
products include waxes (carnauba and wood rosin) on organic fruit and fruit 
products; ethylene for postharvest ripening of tropical fruit and citrus degreening; 
and citric acid and ascorbic acid for fresh-cut fruits. 170  Chlorine is the most 
commonly used synthetic for sanitation of fruit and vegetable surfaces.171 
Agricultural practices must follow an organic plan approved by an accredited 
certifying agent and the producer and handler of the product.172  OFPA creates 
process-based standards, but does not implement standards or require tests for actual 
chemical content in food and does not assess overall land use practices. Thus, 
“certified organic” labeling informs consumers about the food production process, 
but does not directly describe food quality or indicate a lack of land degradation, 
though organic food still is likely to have fewer chemicals than conventional 
counterparts.173 
The U.S. Organic Food Production Act (OFPA) monopolizes the use of the 
term “organic,” requiring all products labeled as “organic” to be certified through 
the government-approved certifiers that comply with all OFPA regulations under the 
National Organic Program. 174  Under one view, it is effective to have a single 
government label bringing singular meaning to a word developing significant cache 
in the food market. 
 
The OFPA, from the point of view of regulatory design and administrative 
law, was strikingly innovative. At the same time that alternatives to 
traditional command-and-control regulation such as risk-based 
decisionmaking and market-like incentives were drawing so much 
attention, the OFPA created a system that could tie public environmental 
and ethical values into existing, real markets; that informed the 
development of governmental organic standards with input from a 
National Organic Standards Board composed of nongovernmental 
representatives from different facets of the organic industry; and that 
                                                     
169 CATHERINE GREENE ET AL., EMERGING ISSUES IN THE U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY, 
ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN; NO. 55, 2 (June 2009), http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
Publications/EIB55/ [http://perma.cc/CGW6-VM97].  
170  Plotto & Narciso, supra note 166, at 288. See National List of Allowed and 
Prohibited Substances, 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.605–.606 (2014). 
171 Plotto & Narciso, supra note 166, at 290 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.605(b) (2014)). 
172 7 U.S.C. §§ 6504–6505 (2012). 
173 Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food 
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 391(2005). However, “[b]ecause food produced in 
accordance with the NOP regulations will not be intentionally sprayed with pesticides or 
intentionally grown or raised using genetically engineered seed or other inputs, the likelihood 
of the presence of pesticide residue or genetically engineered content will clearly be lower 
than in foods intentionally produced with pesticides and genetic engineering techniques. But 
organic food will not be free of such contamination. Evidence clearly indicates that both 
pesticides and genetically engineered plant materials often drift beyond their intended 
applications, and organic food, like any food, may be accidentally contaminated.” Id. at 398. 
174 7 U.S.C § 6505(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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centered regulatory compliance on a system of approved private-sector 
certification rather than a large federal bureaucracy. The OFPA is a 
marketing-oriented statute designed to regularize what was at the time a 
potentially confusing Babel of competing standards with an official 
federal “organic” label. Not only was a federal label thought useful in 
promoting consumer confidence in the growing organic industry within 
the United States, but it was also viewed as helpful in facilitating trade in 
“a potentially lucrative international organic market.175 
 
Despite this approach, consumer confusion remains regarding the meaning of 
“organic.” What counts as organic? For many, the organic label means healthy, 
environmentally friendly, safe, and pesticide-free. While in some cases these 
characteristics are true, they are not elements of the legal definitions of organic—
and legal definitions matter. The NOP created under OFPA creates a four-tiered 
labeling system for organic foods.176 All organics are not created equally.  
 
Table 3: Categories of USDA Organic Foods 
Content of Organic 
Ingredients 
Organic Seal? Permitted Label Phrases 
100% Yes “100% Organic” 
95%-99% Yes “Organic” 
70%-94% No “Made with Organic Ingredients” 
69% or less No Can only list organic ingredients 
 
First, a product can be labeled “100% organic” and carry the USDA and 
certifying agent seals if it contains 100% organically produced ingredients as 
defined by OFPA (e.g., without synthetic substances).177 Second, a product must 
contain at least 95% organic ingredients to be labeled simply “organic” and use the 
USDA and private certifying agent seals.178 Third, a product with at least 70% 
organically produced ingredients (or perhaps better stated, with only 70% organic 
ingredients) can be labeled “made with organic ingredients” and carry the seal of a 
                                                     
175 Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic Agriculture for 
Market- and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1549–50 (2007) (citing JEAN M. 
RAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
PROGRAM AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (2006)). 
176 7 C.F.R. § 205.301 (2014). In addition to looking for “organic” labeled foods, 
consumers can look at five-digit PLU codes. Organic foods all start with 9.  
177 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(a), 205.303 (2014). OFPA defines “synthetic” as “a substance 
that is formulated or manufactured by a chemical process or by a process that chemically 
changes a substance extracted from naturally occurring plant, animal, or mineral sources, 
except that such term shall not apply to substances created by naturally occurring biological 
processes.” 7 U.S.C. § 6502(21) (2012); 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2014). 
178 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(b), 205.303 (2014). 
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private certifying agent.179 Fourth, for products containing less than 70% organic 
ingredients, organic ingredients may be listed on the label, but neither the word 
“organic” nor any seal can be used.180 Thus, consumers of organic products should 
look for the USDA seal over the sole seal of other certifying agents, including state 
governments, because it guarantees at least 95% organic content. Although 
individual U.S. states have the right to seek approval of stricter standards, to date, 
none have attempted to exercise this right. 
Two key and related questions arise in determining the effectiveness of organic 
labeling. First, when a consumer sees the word “organic” on a label, are the different 
meanings of organic clear to the average consumer? And second, does “certified 
organic” mean what consumers think it means? Potentially adding to the confusion, 
agribusiness has sought watered-down definitions of “organic” so they can reap the 
economic benefits of the growing popularity of organic products. For example, 
lobbied by industry to loosen the standard for “organic,” the Secretary of Agriculture 
created rules allowing nonorganic feed to be used in dairy cattle herds that were 
transitioning to an organic diet and permitting the use of synthetic substances in the 
handling of products labeled as organic.181  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Harvey v. Veneman 182 
declared these rules in contravention of the plain language of the OFPA.183 Despite 
this, producers can use chemicals in the production and handling stages if the 
synthetics are not harmful and are necessary because no natural substitute exists.184 
For example, ethylene can be used in post-harvest activities like ripening.185 That 
said, and despite attempts to the contrary, current NOP rules ban genetically 
modified organisms, sewage sludge, and irradiation in certified organic foods.186 
The organic brand also excludes poultry, eggs, or milk from animals raised with 
antibiotics or growth hormones. 
  
                                                     
179 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(c), 205.304.  
180 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(d), 205.305. 
181 Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Organic food regulations 
providing that synthetic substances may be used in processed organic foods ‘as a processing 
aid or adjuvant’ if they meet six criteria and listing thirty-eight synthetic substances 
specifically allowed in or on processed products labeled as organic, are invalid . . . .”).  
182 396 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2005). 
183 Id. at 40 (citation omitted). 
184 7 U.S.C. § 6517(c)(1)(A) (2012).  
185 7 C.F.R. § 205.605(b) (2014). 
186 Friedland, supra note 173, at 383–84. The regulations also prohibit most uses of 
ionizing radiation, the application of sewage sludge as fertilizer, and the use of drugs or 
hormones to promote growth in livestock. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.105(f)–(g), 205.237(b)(1) (2014). 
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(c)  Country of Origin Labeling Provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill 
 
Country of origin labeling (COOL) requires that a food product notify 
consumers of its source location.187 While the underlying rationale for COOL in the 
United States is improving the safety of foreign goods and economic protectionism 
for domestic products, COOL also allows consumers to choose food products that 
did not travel so far to market and thus may have a lower carbon footprint (i.e., lower 
food miles). Also, COOL may provide implicit information to buyers as educated 
consumers may know, for example, whether produce was grown out of season in a 
greenhouse or came from an unsustainable or depleted fishery. COOL requirements 
were enacted in American law under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002 (better known as the 2002 Farm Bill)188 and its implementing regulations,189 as 
well as the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill).190  
Despite objections to COOL by powerful producers and retailers, the idea had 
much support from consumer and product safety organizations. 191  Under the 
American COOL law, retailers, such as grocery stores, supermarkets, and club 
warehouse stores, must provide customers with information regarding the source of 
certain foods. 192  Food products subject to the legislation include “covered 
commodities,” such as cut and ground meats (beef, veal, pork, lamb, goat, and 
chicken), wild and farm-raised fish and shellfish, fresh and frozen fruits and 
vegetables, nuts (peanuts, pecans, and macadamia nuts), and ginseng.193  
There are four labeling categories to indicate a product’s source: (1) U.S. origin 
exclusively; (2) origin and production entirely outside the U.S.; (3) products of the 
U.S. and non-U.S. that have combined origin; (4) products of blended origin.194 
Difficulties arise in designating the country of origin because many food products, 
particularly meats, are produced in multiple countries. For example, beef might 
come from a cow that was born and fed in Canada, but slaughtered and processed in 
                                                     
187 See Peter Chang, Country of Origin Labeling: History and Public Choice Theory, 
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 693, 708 (2009); Anastasia Lewandoski, Country-of-Origin Labeling, 
9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 62 (2008). 
188 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (Farm Bill, 2002), Pub. L. No. 
107-171, § 10816, 116 Stat. 134, 533 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1638 (2006)). 
189 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 60.100–60.400, 65.100–65.500 (2014). 
190 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill, 2008), Pub. L. 110-234, § 
11002, 122 Stat. 923, 1351–1354 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1638 (2006)). 
191 See Chang, supra note 187, at 702.  
192 Agricultural Marketing Service, Country of Origin Labeling (COOL), U.S. DEPT. OF 
AGRICULTURE, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/Cool [http://perma.cc/7ZL9-DESJ] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
193  Id.; see also 7 C.F.R. §§ 60, 65 (listing food products included as covered 
commodities). 
194 C. Parr Rosson III & Flynn J. Adcock, The Potential Impacts of Mandatory Country-
of-Origin Labeling on U.S. Agriculture, in INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
DISPUTES: CASE STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 38 (Andrew Schmitz et al. eds., 2005). 
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the United States. Similarly, products from several countries often are mixed, such 
as for ground beef. For “covered” red meats and chicken, the COOL law: 
 Permits the U.S. origin label to be used only on items from animals that 
were exclusively born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States;  
 Permits meat or chicken with multiple countries of origin to be labeled as 
being from all of the countries in which the animal may have been born, 
raised or slaughtered;  
 Requires meat or chicken from animals imported for immediate U.S. 
slaughter to be labeled as from both the country the animal came from and 
the United States;  
 Requires products from animals not born, raised or slaughtered in the 
United States to be labeled with their correct country(ies) of origin; and  
 Requires, for ground meat and chicken products, that the label list all 
countries of origin, or all “reasonably possible” countries of origin.195  
These meat-labeling requirements have proven to be quite controversial 
because of the steps that U.S. feeding operations and packing plants must adopt to 
segregate foreign-origin livestock from U.S. livestock.196 The “catch-all” label (see 
second bullet, above) was a favorite to many meat processors and retailers, even on 
products that would qualify for the U.S.-only label, because it was both allowed and 
the easiest requirement to meet.197 After objections from COOL supporters that the 
label would be overused and thus undermine the intent of COOL—to distinguish 
between U.S. and non-U.S. meats—a final rule (August 2008) clarified the “multiple 
countries of origin” language.198 The rule stated “that meats derived from both U.S.- 
and non-U.S.-origin animals may carry a mixed-origin claim (e.g., ‘Product of the 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico’), but that the mixed-origin label cannot be used if only 
U.S.-origin meat was produced on a production day.”199  
To pacify continued concerns that COOL’s purpose was being evaded, 
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack asked industry representatives in a February 
2009 letter to voluntarily provide additional information: 
 
                                                     
195  REMY JURENAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN 
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199 JURENAS, supra note 195, at 6 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
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default/files/media/COOL%20FAQs%20Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7JD-NXS5] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015)). 
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[P]rocessors should voluntarily include information about what 
production step occurred in each country when multiple countries appear 
on the label. For example, animals born and raised in Country X and 
slaughtered in Country Y might be labeled as ‘Born and Raised in Country 
X and Slaughtered in Country Y’. Animals born in Country X but Raised 
and Slaughtered in Country Y might be labeled as ‘Born in Country X and 
Raised and Slaughtered in Country Y.’200 
 
For perishable agricultural commodities, ginseng, peanuts, pecans, and 
macadamia nuts, retailers may claim U.S. origin only if they were exclusively 
produced or not subsequently substantially transformed in the United States.201 For 
farm-raised fish and shellfish, a U.S.-labeled product must be derived exclusively 
from fish or shellfish hatched, raised, harvested, and processed in the United States; 
wild fish and shellfish must be derived exclusively from those either harvested in 
U.S. waters or by a U.S. flagged vessel, and processed in the United States or on a 
U.S. vessel. 202  Also, labels must differentiate between wild and farm-raised 
seafood.203 
Future COOL legislation may seek to add the aforementioned labeling scheme 
to essentially all foods by requiring foods to identify the country in which the final 
processing occurs, and mandating that manufacturer websites identify the country 
(or countries) of origin for each ingredient. 204  However, despite the covered 
commodities, there exists a substantial list of products that do not require the COOL 
label—“processed food items.”205 The USDA, the purveyor of the interim final rule, 
has broadly defined processing to include any item “undergoing a specific 
processing to change the character of the commodity or combining it with at least 
one other covered commodity or substantive food component”206—peanut butter, 
thus, is exempt. Items are also exempt if they enter a hotel and restaurant, small-
scale retail outlets, butcher shops, and fish markets.207 “Therefore, large retail outlets 
selling covered commodities to grocery shoppers are likely to be the only place 
country-of-origin labels will be required.”208 
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(d)  Vermont GMO Labeling209 
 
In May 2014, Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin signed into law the “act 
relating to the labeling of food produced with genetic engineering.”210 Supported by 
a coalition of public interest groups and businesses, Vermont’s new law, which will 
go into effect on July 1, 2016, serves as an example of mandatory eco-labeling in 
two different ways. First, it requires that food sold in retail stores in Vermont be 
labeled “as produced entirely or in part from genetic engineering” if it is “entirely 
or partially produced with genetic engineering.”211 Second, the law prohibits foods 
that are defined as “produced with genetic engineering” from bearing the label 
“natural” or a variant thereof.212 Vermont’s law essentially serves as a mandatory 
reverse eco-label, allowing consumers to identify and potentially avoid foods 
produced with genetic engineering. 
The advantage of Vermont’s labeling scheme is that unlike most eco-labeling, 
the label reduces liability and cost rather than increasing it. For instance, if the 
manufacturer of a processed food wishes to label the food “GMO Free,” it must bear 
the costs not only of more expensive ingredients, but also third-party certification, 
and it must take on the risk of potential liabilities due to product contamination.213 
On the other hand, a producer of processed foods that knows that some of its 
ingredients are either produced with genetic engineering or are likely to be produced 
with genetic engineering can simply include the required language on its packaging 
and comply with the law. 
Proponents of the law claim that it serves the public’s “right to know” what is 
in its food. However, Vermont’s law is not without it its critics. Shortly after Gov. 
Shumlin signed the bill into law, an industry trade group sued the state, asserting 
that the law violated the U.S. Constitution. The complaint argues that the law is 
preempted, that it violates the dormant commerce clause, and that it violates the First 
Amendment. Proponents argue that federal preemption does not apply because the 
federal regulation of genetically engineered foods and food labeling does not 
expressly preempt or occupy the field.214 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
upholding a similar Vermont law that required labels on products containing trace 
                                                     
209 This section relies upon Czarnezki et al., Creating Order, supra note 3, at 297–98; 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, § 3043 (effective July 1, 2016). 
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amounts of mercury, held that Vermont’s regulation of a product label was unlikely 
to violate the dormant commerce clause.215 
The most hotly debated question is whether the law unconstitutionally burdens 
commercial speech. Commentators differ on whether federal courts should apply the 
Central Hudson test or the more deferential Zauderer test.216 Central Hudson applies 
an intermediate level of scrutiny to mandatory labels and requires that a labeling law 
advance a “substantial government interest.” Zauderer applies when the purpose of 
a label is to alleviate “consumer confusion” and requires that the label serve a 
legitimate government interest.217 If Vermont’s labeling law survives scrutiny in 
federal court, the motivation to avoid the mandatory label could create a category of 
food that occupies a place between conventional and organic foods. 
 
2.  Self-Declared Private Labels 
 
A major form of voluntary, private-sponsored labeling consists of “self-
declared” or “first-party” claims, some of which state a single attribute like 
“sustainable,” or more recently, make an environmental claim based on a number of 
self-created standards. “A self-declaration environmental claim is one that is made 
without independent third-party certification by manufacturers, importers, 
distributors, retailers, or anyone else likely to benefit from such a claim.”218 The 
proliferation of self-declared eco-labeling schemes has caused widespread consumer 
confusion and skepticism over the veracity of environmental claims, leading many 
manufacturers and retailers to turn to independent, third-party entities to certify that 
environmental product claims are valid.219 Due to the potential legal liabilities and 
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reputational risks posed by “self-declared” or “first-party” eco-labels (e.g., seals of 
approval, certification), retailers should familiarize themselves with the legal 
framework governing such labels. 
 
IV.  SMOOTHING THE TURN 
 
If relying on neoliberal environmental reform (i.e., facing this reality regardless 
of one’s view of this turn), regulation of the neoliberal turn is required. In light of 
the shift from traditional substantive environmental regulation to neoliberal 
substantive environmental regulation, procedural checks are required through 
regulation and legislation. Such procedural checks, building on initiatives like the 
FTC Green Guides, would improve the quality of the market-based and 
informational neoliberal approaches. Procedural checks should include oversight via 
regulation that ensures accuracy in valuation of natural resources, increases and 
improves the quality of the information provided by consumers, and requires greater 
accountability and accuracy from institutions making green claims to consumers. 
 
A.  Improving Market-Based Approaches 
 
Despite criticism of the neoliberal turn in environmental regulation, it is still a 
reality. Critics have argued that the move to market-based mechanisms as a solution 
to environmental problems means that progressive environmentalists have sold out 
their values and “have accepted the conservative definition of the problem—that 
environmental degradation is caused by a failure to ‘value’ the environment and a 
lack of properly defined property rights and therefore environmental degradation 
results from a failure of the market to attach a price to environmental goods and 
services.”220  
Market-based approaches to environmental problems and solutions, proponents 
argue, provide more holistic analyses of options and greater efficiency.221 These 
policies should “allow any desired level of pollution cleanup to be realized at the 
lowest overall cost to society.”222 Meanwhile, command-and-control policies, so the 
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story goes, fail to take into account costs, or even the liberty to implement differing 
techniques to achieve favorable environmental results.223 
However, market-based policies are still lacking in certain regards. First, there 
are some challenges in the valuation of the resources at issue, a necessary part of the 
market-based mechanism. One such challenge stems from the fact that in valuing 
the environment and natural resources, regulators either assume that the value will 
remain unchanged or predict how these resources will be valued by future 
generations, also known as discounting.224 For example, the costs of mitigating or 
adapting to climate change are large now, and many of the benefits will largely 
remain unseen for several generations.225 The selection of a discount rate can, itself, 
also be influenced by our current values, as described by the rate of social time 
preference, or “the rate at which society is willing to exchange consumption and 
enjoyment opportunities in the present for similar opportunities in the future.”226  
Personal preferences will also dictate the values attributed to certain 
environmental resources or services: “While markets may accurately measure 
individual consumer preferences, they are incapable of reflecting collective 
environmental values because most environmental resources are incapable of being 
accurately priced.”227 “Markets persistently fail to produce the ecological and health 
information necessary to allocate efficiently environmental resources,” and make a 
mistake by focusing on willingness to pay.228 This subjective influence must be 
considered in any environmental valuation analysis and environmental issues, such 
as climate change, vulnerable to this must also be clearly identified. 
Equity issues are also rooted in these market-based approaches, as the value 
attributed to the environment or certain natural resources can differ throughout 
populations and across time and place.229 For example, “the economic value of a 
service will be very different depending on the livelihood circumstances, income 
levels and other socio-economic conditions such as price levels, population density, 
distances between beneficiaries and the resource . . . .”230  
The market-based approach, despite providing some clarity to environmental 
decision-making processes, is burdened by uncertainty.231 First, the value of some 
ecosystem services, for example, is not fully known or understood.232 Over- or 
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undervaluation could result in the permanent loss of certain natural resources or lost 
economic or development opportunities. Second, the value of certain resources 
might change over time.233 Third, threshold pollutants are difficult to value, in that 
the increase in cost as the pollutants aggregate is not linear.234 Thus, “it is important 
to realize that in certain circumstances related to nonlinear damage functions, 
market-based solutions cannot work well due to its inherent character.”235 Market-
based solutions, while proven to be successful in some areas of environmental 
policy, should not be implemented universally, or at least not without caution.  
Many of these challenges with market-based environmental policies are 
associated with a lack of principles and regulations that guide the development of 
these mechanisms.236 These principles and regulations are necessary to ensure that 
the policies are implemented and reviewed appropriately and consistently.237 This 
guidance can also help alleviate the stigma that exists against market-based policies, 
which can often lead to political or community resistance.238 Much of this stigma 
stems from the idea that these mechanisms defend the “right to pollute.”239 This 
stigma can be alleviated by transparencies in the development and operation of these 
mechanisms, as well as consistency and accuracy in the valuation techniques 
involved.240  
Market-based mechanisms, now entrenched in our current environmental 
policies, require reevaluation and the implementation of oversight tools. Guidelines 
and regulations must be implemented to ensure consistency, accuracy, and 
transparency in market-based environmental policies. More importantly, perhaps, 
we must understand the limitations of these policies, where more traditional 
mechanisms will still be required. For example, market-based mechanisms can be 
successful where “there is little risk of irreversible damages; the relevant outcomes 
are relatively short-term; there are no fundamental ethical or philosophical issues at 
stake; prices are not excessively volatile; and traditional regulation is expensive or 
ineffective.”241 
Many of the aforementioned challenges to market-based environmental 
policies can also be alleviated through greater disclosure of information. Ideally, 
decision makers and consumers would have a complete set of information to 
evaluate the value of existing resources and all externalities associated with 
proposed actions. However, “market forces do not necessarily lead to full (or 
efficient) disclosure of information,” leading to the conclusion that there is a good 
rationale for disclosure requirements. Markets cannot function well with distorted 
and imperfect information; hence, requirements that lead to improved information 
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can (by and large) lead to better resources allocations.” 242  Ecosystem services 
analyses, for example, can help fill this informational need and “[r]egulation that 
mandates consideration of a more complete set of information concerning the 
environmental and economic impacts of resources use ensures more efficient 
management of resources by correcting resource market inefficiencies resulting 
from incomplete information.”243  
To alleviate many of the above concerns, it is also important that these complete 
information sets come from a variety of sources, “rather than under information 
monopoly conditions.” 244  As environmental valuation can be vulnerable to 
subjective influences, it is best that the information sets extensively cover ecosystem 
services and externalities, but also from the perspectives of diverse populations, 
when applicable. Thus, this solution is twofold: legally mandated expansion of 
ecosystem services, or other environmental valuation analyses, and regulation that 
requires the consideration of these complete information sets. This solution may 
require that market-based environmental policies not be isolated from traditional 
regulatory schemes, as the market alone will not generate this information, but will 
rather stifle its proliferation. Instead, a hybrid scheme could mandate information 
generation, while also setting for market-based mechanisms.  
Market-based environmental policies can also build in resilience or adaptation 
options. A resilient policy might allow for the desired outcome within a certain range 
of uncertainty, which might remain inherent, despite increased information 
availability.245 An adaptive policy might allow policymakers “to respond to new 
information as it becomes available.”246 These two options perhaps allow for the 
integration of the precautionary principle into a classic cost-benefit analysis. 
 
B.  Improving Information Regulation 
 
The proliferation of eco-labels and informational regulation has led to concerns 
of greenwashing247 and a lack of transparency, clarity, and trust in labeling, all of 
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which exacerbate consumer confusion and can lead to industry liability. Consumers 
also desire an increase in information about products and improved quality of that 
information. For eco-labels that are of high quality and successful, markets must be 
created, products meeting those standards must be available, and administrative and 
certification costs must be addressed. 
Federal and state agencies with jurisdiction over green claims have much to do 
to improve the clarity, consistency, and credibility of green claims for products, but 
regulatory reform is only one part of the solution.248 Industry will also play a critical 
role in creating more transparency, accountability, and meaning among green market 
claims. 249  Some combination of government, industry, and stakeholder-driven 
solutions will ultimately be necessary to bolster the integrity and utility of labeling 
as a tool to drive and communicate environmental improvements in our food 
production systems.250 These solutions include using mandatory labels as a baseline, 
improving third-party certification standards, creating stronger standards in 
consumer protection law, and embracing life-cycle analysis.251 
Known from an investigation into the USDA organic certification, 
governments can provide significant trust among consumers, and the funding 
governments provide can be used to promote large-scale acceptance of the 
certification. 252  Centralized government eco-labels are more effective than 
numerous private ones, and simple, clear, obvious, and transparent seal-of-approval 
logos and labels have generally shaped consumer behavior more than the complex 
information-disclosure labels.253  
Given the problems inherent in labeling, independent third-party certification 
schemes are widely regarded as an important tool in driving improvements 
throughout the chain of food production systems. For producers, they can offer an 
incentive structure and roadmap for improving production.254 For buyers, they can 
provide a basis to establish measurable sustainability goals, enhance brand 
credibility, and buffer against risk, and for consumers, certified products offer a level 
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of assurance, verification, and transparency into their purchases.255 Indeed, well-
designed and effectively implemented certification schemes can fuel improvements 
by providing market recognition to those working to address and minimize the 
adverse impacts of food production.256  
Future certification schemes must reduce the costs and administrative burdens 
of pursuing formal certification, increase the number of available products that are 
certified, rally around a fewer number of high-quality labels that will limit confusion 
and increase consumer recognition and support, incentivize continuous 
improvement of information generation and quality, and embrace life-cycle 
analysis. 257  A mandatory labeling scheme would allow for better and more 
consistent enforcement and for consumers to more consistently “reward 
manufacturers marketing environmentally superior products.” 258  The governing 
agency would be better able to enforce violations with a mandatory scheme, 
expending less resources on each action, as “any misleading advertisement would 
automatically constitute a violation.”259  
Any labeling guidelines must be clear, and ideally based on scientific 
language. 260  Vague guidelines confuse consumers and allow companies to 
promulgate vague statements on their products that further reduce the value of any 
labeling scheme. Proponents of specific standards thus argue that any future 
environmental regulations should provide definitions that are as specific as possible, 
“directing advertisers to make precise claims about the ingredients or environmental 
effects of their products [because] [v]ague standards are inadequate for creating 
meaningful distinctions among product labels.”261 This can also be accomplished by 
reducing the number of standards for a certain type of environmental claim, in order 
to increase clarity and reduce consumer confusion.262 Terminology must also be 
updated to reflect current technology and environmental awareness.263 
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Eco-labeling regulations can also be improved through national uniformity, 
rather than different standards in each state, for example.264 Without uniform eco-
labeling standards, enforcement is more difficult and companies incur greater “direct 
costs like printing new labels for each state and indirect costs such as maintaining 
two or more product inventories and imposing separate distribution and record-
keeping requirements for each state.”265 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The United States has taken a different path than many of its counterparts, 
tending to rely on a “market-regulation” approach whereby consumers express their 
desire for specific welfare practices through their purchasing decisions. 266  The 
challenge in this trend is that it asks for the challenging valuation of natural resources 
and asks consumers to make choices in the aggregate that will achieve 
environmental goals when they may not be in the best position to do so. We may 
underestimate actual values, and consumer choice may not be the best proxy for the 
environmental goals actually desired by consumers. And high-quality data for 
valuation and information purposes may be challenging to acquire. Without 
smoothing out some of these challenges, due to economic interests and institutional 
isomorphism, the quality of valuation and the meaning of labels and claims may 
decline in quality. 267  Regardless of whether it is the pursuit of free-market or 
information regulation, guidelines and regulations must be implemented to ensure 
consistency, accuracy, enforcement, 268  and transparency in market-based 
environmental policies. That said, and more importantly, perhaps, we must 
understand the limitations of these policies where more traditional mechanisms will 
still be required. 
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